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Abstract
Why do portfolio managers actively manage their stock portfolios? The finance literat-
ure suggests the importance of financial incentives, effort, information and career concerns.
We suggest that personality can also be a factor. We perform an experiment with industry
experts. The experiment documents that, in a group decision setting, subjects with high
aggression, measured by a standard psychology test, were much more likely to deviate
from market tracking. In an individual decision setting, these same subject’s behavior was
not significantly affected by aggressiveness. This result suggests that, in group settings,
personality, rather than cognitive biases, might be the most important source of behavioral
deviations from the rational choice paradigm.
1
1 Introduction
Rational-choice economics and cognitive psychology have a great deal to say about the incent-
ives and biases that affect the decision-making of institutional portfolio managers. In this paper,
we investigate the unexplored question of whether social psychology can also provide signi-
ficant insights. We perform a laboratory experiment in which seasoned financial professionals
make portfolio allocation decisions. We find that in a group setting, a key social psycho-
logy variable, personality, and in particular aggressiveness, dominates all other determinants
of portfolio choice. In contrast, in an individual decision-making context, we find that man-
agers’ choices are not affected by aggressiveness. This result suggests that research into the
determinants of institutional investor behavior needs to account for the influence of personality.
The literature in financial economics on active portfolio management can broadly be di-
vided into two streams. A theoretical literature that investigates reason how effort, information,
and career concerns can distort affect the incentives for active management and an empirical
literature that considers the effect of active management on the returns to mutual funds and
investors in mutual funds. Broadly speaking, the consensus of the theoretical literature is that
controlling the behavior of portfolio managers through incentive contracts is more difficult
than controlling agent behavior in standard principal–agent models and that incentive problems
associated with delegated investment management lead to sub-optimally high levels of active
management. 1
In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical research has not reached a consensus on
the overall value effect of active management. Fama and French (2010) present evidence which
suggests that, on average, active management reduces returns to mutual fund investors. In con-
trast Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that the fraction of a mutual fund’s portfolio under
active management is positively associated with investor returns. Berk and Green (2004) ar-
gue that, assuming rational asset pricing, decreasing returns to scale, and perfect competition
between fund investors, the gains from active management should be captured by fund man-
1See Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), Rajan and Srivastava (2000), Ross (2004), Carpenter (2000), and Dow and
Gorton (1997).
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agers. One, albeit fairly obvious conclusion concerning the value of active management that
can be drawn from theory and evidence on delegated portfolio management is that the value
creation effect of active management is reduced by incentive distortions.
In this paper we consider another potential source of distortion, one that has not been con-
sidered by the finance literature—aggression. More specifically we focus on the personality
trait aggression, which is stable in adult life, and not the state aggression which we all some-
times experience. The trait approach assume that personality traits differ across individuals, but
are stable within an individual (during adulthood) and over time (McCrae and Costa, 2003), and
that these traits shape the persons behavior.2
In recent years a number of economics models have shown that incorporating personality
traits into economic models can significantly increase their predictability (Rustichini, DeYoung,
Anderson, and Burks (2012),Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), Rustichini, DeYoung, Ander-
son, and Burks (2012), Kugler, Neeman, and Vulkan (2014), Dupuy and Galichon (2014)). We
focus on aggression because we believe it is prevalent in the finance industry in general and
with portfolio managers in particular. Furthermore, the industry seeks and rewards aggressive
behavior.3 A quick glance at recruitment materials for money management jobs reveals many
quotes such as “we are seeking individuals that are intelligent and aggressive.” Popular books
describing the money management business are full of references to culture of aggressive be-
havior and how quickly it spread in Wall Street and London in the 80s and 90s (e.g., pp. 106-7
in Endlich (2000)). Personality matters most when we interact with others. This is why it
is particularly relevant to many economic situations. Fund managers either work in teams or
must regularly report their decisions to risk managers, investment committees, managers and
even shareholders. To test all this we present conduct an experiment involving experienced
finance practitioners. We present them with a choice between passive index tracking and in-
vesting in a share that can return more or less than the index. The setup is such that they should
largely be skeptical about investing in this share. We find that when our experts are in a group
2Examples can be found in Barrick, Mount, and Judge (2001), Hurtz and Donovan (2000), Hogan and Holland
(2003), Hogan and Holland (2003), Poropat (2009), and Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, and Goldberg (2007); but
see Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, and Schmitt (2007), for a different perspective.
3In fact, among practitioners the terms aggressive and active portfolio management are often interchangeable.
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situation personality “takes over”—aggressive managers are far more likely to opt for active
management than passively track the index. As a control, when the same subjects face a math-
ematically equivalent decision problem individually (not in a group) then personality has no
impact on their decision and they behave as predicted by standard finance theory.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the precise
details of the decisions we use and the theoretical analysis of these; section 3 describes our
design and procedure; section 4 sets out our findings. We discuss our finding and conclude in
section 5.
2 The decision problem
Each subject must choose between passively tracking the index and investing in stock A. The
stock can either earn the index return plus 20% or the index return less 30%. The index returns
20%. Each subject is part of a group of 5. Each subject receives an independent signal about
stock A. The signal is either “good” or “bad.” Subjects are informed that the probability of
receiving a good signal given that the stock will return the index plus 20% is greater than 50%
and the probability of receiving a bad signal given that the stock will return the index less 20%
is also greater than 50%. Each subject sees all signals (hers and, in the group experiment, the
other four signals) before making her decision. The control individual experiment is identical
to the group experiment except that subjects are on their own—not part of any group. In the
experiments, we focus on the case where (1) in the control case subjects receive a bad signal,
and (2) in the group experiment there are 2 “good” and 3 bad signals, and the subject receives
a good signal.
2.1 Optimal investing strategies for Bayes rational agents
In this section, we consider the Bayes rational solution to the participants decision problem and
belief-based deviations from Bayes rationality that might explain investment choices. We focus
on the group experiment because it is central to testing our hypotheses regarding the effect of
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aggression on portfolio manager behavior. Because the decision problem is very simple, the
the analysis of the problem produces no surprising results. For this reason, to avoid taxing the
readers patience, we will simply state some fairly obvious properties of the subject’s inference
problem and defer detailed derivations of these properties to Appendix A. To facilitate the
discussion of these results, we will say that signal quality is symmetric if (a) the signal is
equally precise when conditioned on a high or low return on the stock, and (b) all subjects
receive signals of equal quality.
Our first observation is that if a subject believes that signal quality is symmetric, and the
subject is weakly risk averse, investing in the index is the optimal decision. This follows
because, under the symmetry assumption, posterior beliefs conditioned on the signals depend
only on the difference between the number of good and bad signals. In both the baseline
group experiment and the individual control experiment, the number of bad signal exceeds the
number of good signal by one signal. Thus, given symmetric signal quality, the probability that
the stock will beat the index is less than 50%. Given that the upside gain when the stock beats
the index is less than the downside loss, this implies that the expected return on the stock is less
than the expected return on the index. Moreover, the variation in return, measured by second-
order stochastic dominance, is greater for the stock. Thus, a risk neutral or risk averse investor
who believes that signal quality is symmetric will track rather than invest in the stock. The
size of the loss from investing in the stock is increasing in the subject’s assessment of signal
quality and in the subject’s risk aversion. However, even if the subject believes that the signal
is uninformative and the subject is risk neutral, investing in the stock is strictly suboptimal.
Thus, rationalizing subject’s choice of investing in the stock requires relaxing at least one
of the two symmetry conditions. In the appendix we show that relaxing the assumption that
signal quality is independent of the return on the stock can rationalize investing in the stock.
Investing in the stock is only rationalized if the subject believes that the signal is much more
precise when the return on the stock is low. In this case, if the realized return is low, the
subject expects almost all the signals to be be bad while, if the return is high, the subject
expects the signals will be more or less random. Since, in the the experiment, the number of
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good signals is close to the number of bad signals, and thus fairly “random,” such a subject
would infer from the high degree of variation in the signals that the return will be high based
on their belief that signal variance is much higher when the realized payoff on the stock is
high. As we show in Appendix A, the degree of asymmetry required to support investing is
extreme. Moreover, asymmetry is not motivated by the experiment’s instructions and the line
of reasoning connecting this sort of signal asymmetry to posterior assessments is complex.
Thus, we doubt that this sort of asymmetric assessment of signal quality played an important
role in subject decision making.
A more plausible rationalization of investing in the stock is produced by relaxing the as-
sumption that that subject believe that all subjects receive signals of equal quality. Define an
“arrogant” subject as a subject who believes that her own signal is very precise and all other
subjects signals are nearly uninformative. An arrogant subject both overweights her own signal
relative to the signals of others and places a high absolute value on the quality of her signal.
A sufficiently arrogant subject, with fairly low risk aversion, who receives a positive signal,
will choose to invest in the stock. In our baseline experiment, the group experiment, subjects
received positive signals. Thus, a high degree of arrogance rationalizes stock investing in the
group experiment. However, in the individual experiment, since the subject received a negative
signal, an arrogant subject would experience larger losses from investing in the stock than a
subject who believed that signal quality was symmetric.
Thus, the most plausible hypotheses for subject behavior, under the assumption of Bayesian
rationality and weak subject risk aversion, is that (a) in the group experiment, subjects will
invest in the stock in the stock only if they are arrogant, i.e. attribute high quality to their own
signal and low quality to the signals received by others and (b) in the control experiment, all
investors will track.
Experimental researchers have discovered that, when Bayesian/Nash predictions of subject
behavior are difficult to confirm in an experimental setting, frequently quantile response models
based on Bayesian best replies nevertheless closely fit subject behavior (Goeree, Holt, and
Palfrey, 2002). In quantile response models, subjects play strategies with a probability that is
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proportional to the payoff from the strategy. The strategy that yield the higher payoff under the
agents utility function, is not played with probability 1. However odds that the agent will play
a given strategy versus another strategy is increasing in the difference in the payoffs produced
by the two strategies. Under the hypothesis that subjects exhibit quantile response behavior,
and that the payoffs they obtain from the two investment alternatives are based on Bayesian
evaluation of the expected utility of wealth that the strategies generate, we predict that (a)in the
group treatment, arrogant and/or low risk aversion subjects will be more likely to invest in the
stock (b) in the individual experiment low risk aversion subjects will be more likely to invest in
the stock and arrogant subjects will be less likely to invest.
2.2 The affect of aggressiveness on subject behavior
So far we looked at what should a fully rational decision maker do in the decision problem faced
by our subjects. Our alternative explanation is that personality, and aggression in particular,
matters. Lauriola and Levin (2001) show individuals with high scores engage in less risky
decisions in the gains domain, but more risk taking in the domain of losses. In our setting
this would mean that aggression should be positively correlated with investment. Personality
matters more in a social context and therefore we would expect that this correlation to be
significantly stronger in the group setting than in our control, individual decision problem.
The exact mechanism by which personality enters into into agents’ subjective decision cal-
culus is indeed problematic. One obvious possibility is that it affects subjects’ subjective prob-
ability distributions in a fairly context-independent fashion. In our setting, high aggressiveness
could simply make subjects more arrogant. Under this hypothesis, based on the analysis in
the previous section, we would expect high-aggression to bias subjects toward investing in the
group treatments and against investing in the individual treatments. A second possibility is that
aggression affects decision making of agents who are endowed with state-dependent utility by
affecting their decisions only in states where the decision is made in a group context. High-
aggression decision makers might have an “individual-decision self” and a “group-decision
self.” The individual decision self could be risk avoiding and cautious while the group de-
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cision self might be risk-taking and relatively unconcerned with downside risk.4 Alternatively,
a third possibility is that, in group contexts, high-aggression individuals simply act impulsively
and make non-maximizing decisions, with impulsive, aggressive, responses displacing rational
calculated responses.
Our individual control treatment is designed to provide some evidence on the plausibility of
the first alternative. Our design does not permit us to distinguish between the second and third
alternatives. However, the problem of determining the mechanism through which personality
affects decisions is a general problem in the literature on personality and decision making
(Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Ter Weel, 2008). If personality factors are of first-
order importance in investor decision making then realistic models of investor behavior need
to incorporate these factors despite their rather awkward fit with utility-based approaches to
modeling agent choice.
3 Design of experiment
3.1 Design approach
Following Bossaerts (2009) we adopt the general principles of “ecological design” in studying
financial decision making. Ecological design stresses (a) the importance of using subjects who
are familiar with decision problems similar to the decision problem being investigated in the
experiment and (b) and designing and framing the problem to so that it resembles problems
these subjects typically encounter rather than resembling a maths quiz.
We address the first point by using only experienced finance practitioners as subjects in our
experiment. Our subjects have an average of just over 11 years of making investment decisions.
Using experienced subjects mitigate the confounding effects that cognitive biases might have
on our investigation of the effect of personality on decision making.5 Thus, any systematic
4For more discussion of dynamically rational decision making when decision makers preferences are time or
context dependent, see Strotz (1955) and Peleg and Yaari (1973).
5The literature on behavioral finance is rich in examples of such biases, e.g., holding on to “losers” and selling
“winners.” However, behavioral finance researchers have show that many biases diminish, or even disappear, with
experience. For example Barber et al 2009 which shows that in Taiwan virtually all day traders lose money while
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deviation from rationality we find with our expert investors is likely to correspond to a real and
persistent bias that does not diminish with experience.
In fact, in our experiment, subjects were remarkably rational individually choosing between
risky prospects. The rationality of individual subject decision making under uncertainty is
amply illustrated by their responses to the Holt and Laury risk questionnaire. H&L is a standard
method of estimating risk attitude and is widely used in economics and finance experiments. In
the H&L risk questionnaire, subjects face 10 consecutive decisions between lottery A and B,
where B remains the same while A becomes progressively riskier. A rational decision maker
will switch exactly once from choosing A to B, or will stick with the same option for all 10
decisions. For typical subject pools, many subjects switch more than once, resulting in between
30% and 40% of observation having to be discarded (and sometimes, all other decisions made
by these subjects also need to be also ignored).
In our experiment all subjects behaved exactly as predicted by expected utility theory—
witching between the to alternatives only once. In our experience this is extremely rare—
certainly not something either of us or any of our other co-authors ever seen before. These
responses provide strong support for our subjects indeed being experts in financial decision
making.
The second aspect of ecological design is presenting subjects with a decision problem seems
like real financial decisions and not a maths quiz. Our design makes every effort to look and
feel as real as possible through our choice of language and the user interface. We believe that
these attempts to look and feel real are particularly noticeable in the group decision scenario,
which is at the heart of our study: Here subjects are in groups of 5 and each receives her/his own
signal. The five signals appear on the screen one of the after the other, giving the impression of
information being received by the group in real time even though in reality each group received
the exact same signals in the same order. Subjects were allowed to send messages to the other
members of the group before making the final decision. Once again, this gave our subjects the
impression of a real group and real time decisions even though messages did not actually go
institutional investors get gain by taking advantage of the cognitive biases of the day traders.
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anywhere in real time. This may seem a little “lose” but we made sure that we never at any
point deceived our subjects in any way. We believe that on balance our design our effective
in making subjects feel like they are part of a group that gets real time information and has to
come up with a decision in respond to this information.
At the same time, we aimed to provide only the minimal contextual information required to
make the problem appear to to be a real investment problem. For example, we never specified
the index tracked by the tracking portfolio or the industry which the the alternative stock op-
erates. By specifying that the information signals on concern the alternative individual stock
investment, we minimized the effect of agent optimism or pessimism regarding overall eco-
nomic and/or stock market performance. Finally, or minimalist formulation of the group de-
cision problem controlled for the contaminating effects of that personality factors that effect
subjects ability to influence other subjects might have on the results of our experiments, which
was designed to test the effect of personality in a group setting on subject choices between risky
prospects rather than the effect of personality on the ability of subjects to influence groups to
adopt their their preferred outcome. If we had measured subject choices after actual interac-
tions with other subjects, personality variables such as extroversion, which have been shown
to facilitate dominance in group decision making, [NIR CITE PLEASE]would have played a
key role in the subject choices. If such variables were correlated with aggressiveness these
influence effects would have confounded our results.
Finally, our treatment which featured individual decision making was optimized to identify
the effect cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, in the group experiment. For this reason
the design specified that, in the group treatment subject received a positive signal regarding the
alternative investment while in the individual treatment they received a negative signal. Under
this design, if subject aggressiveness acted as a simply proxy for overconfidence, then aggress-
iveness would reduce the likelihood of investing in the alternative investment in the individual
setting by roughly the same amount as it increased the likelihood of investing in the alternative
in the group setting. Thus, this design produces a sharp test for the hypothesis that the effect
of aggressiveness results simply from a confounding correlation between aggressiveness and
Naked Aggression 18th February, 2015 9
overconfidence.
3.2 Specific protocols
The experiment took place on January 17th 2014. Fifty two people participated in the online
experiment. Participants were recruited through the Diploma in Financial Strategy course at the
Said Business School, University of Oxford (http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/programmes/degrees/dfs).
The gender split was 80% male and 20% female. The experiment lasted about 30 minutes. The
distribution of subjects in the subject pool is as follow: about 40% are aged 20-30, 27% aged
30-40, 25% aged 40-50 and 8% aged 50-60. The participants come from diverse ethnic back-
grounds. Subjects had on average just over 11 years of experience in making investments
decisions.
3.2.1 Design
Half the participants completed the individual decision problem before the group and the other
half in the opposite order. After completing the investment decision problems subjects com-
pleted a standard Holt and Laury risk assessment task, followed by a 74 questionnaire including
gender, age, experience, the Big 5 and the Buss and Perry aggression questionnaire. At the end
of the experiment, 4 subjects were selected at random and were paid depending on their choices
and performance: Consistent with the instructions below they received £20 if they chose to
track the index. If they chose to invest in the new stock their pay was determined by a random
to be either £24 or £14 (see the instructions below for more details).
3.2.2 Software
The software used was an online experimental platform which the subjects accessed through
their web browsers. The software randomly selected for each participant, whether they should
see the individual or the group task first. The software recorded all inputs from the participants
into a single database.
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4 Results of experiment
4.1 Data description
Summary statistics for the variables used in the study are presented in Table 1. As one might
expect given that the the experiment recruited financial professionals. The mean age of sub-
jects in fairly high (35) and right skewed. Mean experience has the same characteristics. In
contrast to these demographic variables, the instruments used to measure personality factors,
except for Rotter scale, exhibited little skewness and less L-kurtosis than a Normal distribu-
tion (L-Kurtosis of the normal ≈ 0.1226). This is not surprising given that the design of these
instruments was to some extent shaped by a desire for producing “regular distributions.” In con-
trast, the one subject characteristic not measured with a personality instrument, risk aversion,
exhibited more significant divergence from the Normal distribution: it was somewhat skewed
(L-skew = 0.08) and quite kurtotic relative to the normal distribution (L-kurtosis = 0.20).
AGG AGREE ROTT NEURO OPEN CONS EXTRA RISK EXP AGE
Mean 26.60 33.10 2.61 20.80 37.90 34.90 28.50 5.36 11.20 35.50
Median 25.50 33.00 3.00 20.00 38.00 35.00 29.00 5.00 9.00 35.00
Std. Dev. 7.87 4.61 1.19 5.72 4.09 5.22 5.28 1.66 7.36 10.30
Mean Dev. 8.88 5.20 1.21 6.57 4.69 6.02 6.05 1.80 7.95 11.40
L-CV 0.17 0.08 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.35 0.16
L-Skewness 0.14 -0.03 -0.15 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.25 0.16
L-Kurtosis 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.17 -0.08
Table 1: Summary statistics
Figure 2 presents the sample correlations between the variables measured in the experiment.
Except for the obvious positive correlation between age and experience, none of the correlations
exceed 0.50. The non personality variable, risk aversion, correlation with the personality vari-
ables was very weak, with the exception of a strong positive correlation with conscientiousness
and the risk aversion measure (r = 0.31. Aggression exhibited a strong negative correlation
with agreeableness (r =−0.46), and, as predicted by psychological theory, it exhibited a fairly
strong positive correlation with neuroticism (r = 0.27). Aggression scores were only weakly
correlated with risk aversion and perhaps surprisingly, the correlation was positive r = 0.17,
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i.e. aggressive subjects were more risk averse on average. This pattern of correlation makes
if difficult to argue that aggression is a proxy for risk tolerance. Table 2 also shows that male
subjects on scored higher on aggressiveness and lower on conscientiousness and risk aversion.
AGG AGREE ROTT NEURO OPEN CONS EXTRA RISK GENDER EXP AGE
AGG 1.00 -0.46 -0.15 0.27 -0.04 -0.15 -0.25 0.17 0.35 -0.15 -0.21
AGREE – 1.00 -0.00 -0.29 -0.19 0.07 0.16 -0.30 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20
ROTT – – 1.00 -0.35 -0.06 0.42 0.46 0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.14
NEURO – – – 1.00 0.17 -0.23 -0.34 -0.13 0.08 0.19 0.16
OPEN – – – – 1.00 0.10 0.26 0.14 -0.14 0.28 0.32
CONS – – – – – 1.00 0.30 0.31 -0.32 0.10 -0.03
EXTRA – – – – – – 1.00 0.09 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22
RISK – – – – – – – 1.00 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06
GENDER – – – – – – – – 1.00 0.03 0.14
EXP – – – – – – – – – 1.00 0.74
AGE – – – – – – – – – – 1.00
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
4.2 Results: Group Decisions
The key question we are investigating is the effect of aggression on portfolio choice behavior in
a group setting. Tables 3 and 4 present univariate tests for the effect of aggression on portfolio
behavior. Table 3 presents non-parametric Mann-Whitney test of the null hypothesis the median
aggression score of tracking subjects is the same as the median aggression score of investing
subjects. The test decisively rejects the null hypothesis (p= 0.007). Table 4 presents the results
of univariate logit regression of the probability of investing on aggression. The null hypothesis
that the coefficient associated with the aggression score is zero is decisively rejected p= 0.017.
Both of these tests point to a significant positive relation between aggression and deviations
from the market portfolio.
Mann-Whitney Test
µ-Invest µ-Track U P-Value
AGG 32.3 24.9 265 0.007
#Obs. 10 34 – –
Table 3: Group Decisions: Univariate Nonparametric Analysis
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Estimate Standard Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -4.770 1.600 -2.980 0.003
AGG 0.125 0.052 2.390 0.017
Table 4: Group Decisions: Univariate Logit Analysis
In order to investigate possibility of confounding effects, we performed a multivariate logit
analysis, including as controls the other personality variables, the risk aversion measure, and
demographic variables. The results of these regression estimates are provided in Table 5. Once
again the coefficient associated with aggression is very significant (p = 0.032). Moreover, the
coefficient for aggression is the only coefficient that even approaches significance at conven-
tional levels. In fact, in results not reported, we performed univariate parametric as well as
non-parametric test of the significance for all of the other variables. None of these tests pro-
duced significant median differences between the tracking and investing subjects or significant
coefficients in the logit specification.
Estimate Std. Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -3.870 8.400 -0.461 0.645
AGG 0.162 0.076 2.150 0.032
AGREE 0.027 0.112 0.237 0.813
ROTTER 0.249 0.459 0.543 0.587
NEURO -0.009 0.089 -0.099 0.922
OPEN -0.038 0.141 -0.269 0.788
CONS -0.062 0.107 -0.580 0.562
EXTRA -0.021 0.099 -0.216 0.829
RISK -0.090 0.315 -0.286 0.775
GENDER -0.577 1.430 -0.404 0.686
EXP -0.030 0.090 -0.335 0.737
AGE 0.060 0.076 0.799 0.424
Table 5: Group Decisions: Multivariate Analysis
Thus, in our experiment aggression is the only significant predictor for deviations from the
market portfolio in a group setting. Granting that aggression is a significant predictor of devi-
ations from market tracking, naturally raises the question of the magnitude of the aggression
effect. To answer this question we compared the estimated probability of investing of an in-
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vestor with a mean level of measured aggressiveness, µ with the probability of investing for
and investor with measured aggressiveness one standard deviation above the mean, µ +σ us-
ing both the univariate and multivariate logit models. Or results show that the magnitude of
the aggression effect is quite large. In the univariate model, a one standard deviation increase
in measured aggressiveness increased the probability of investing from 0.191 to 0.387. Under
the multivariate specification, a one standard deviation increase increased the probability from
0.172 to 0.427. In both cases, the increase in the probability of investing exceeded a mean
subjects probability of investing.
P(µ+σAGG) P(µ) ∆P
Univariate 0.387 0.191 0.196
Multivariate 0.427 0.172 0.255
Table 6: Group Decisions: Economic Significance of Aggressiveness
4.3 Individual Decisions
The group experiments test the core hypothesis of the paper—that, in social decision making
environments, aggression affects portfolio manager behavior. These tests showed that, even
after controlling for risk attitudes, demographics, and other personality factors, aggression,
as measured by our instrument, had a significant positive relation with deviations from the
tracking portfolio. The question remains as to whether our instrument captures subject ag-
gressiveness or some other uncontrolled preference and/or personality factor. We investigated
this issue by means of the control experiment in which subjects made choices as individuals
outside the group context, between investing and tracking. This experiment is useful because
the social psychology emphasizes the effect of personality factors on behavior in social group
contexts rather than their effect on decision making. If in fact, our instrument has captures
personality effects, we expect that the effect of measured aggressiveness on individual decision
will be much more modest than its effect on group decision. In contrast, if aggression captures
an uncontrolled aspect agent beliefs and/or preferences regarding the investment choices them-
selves, then, the captured characteristic should effect decisions in both the individual and group
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settings.
Assuming that our instrument for measuring risk is effective in controlling for risk aversion,
the captured characteristic would relate to subject beliefs about about the information structure.
As discussed in Section 2, the most plausible belief-based explanation for subjects deviating
from the market portfolio and investing in the group context is based on subject assessments
of the quality of their signal relative to the signals received by other group members. In that
section we showed that choosing investing over tracking required that a subject exhibit a great
deal of both absolute and relative signal confidence, i.e., the subject must assign a high degree
of precision to her own signal and believe that the quality of other subjects’ signals is much
lower. If our instrument for aggression simply captures signal confidence, then the measure
should also affect individual decisions. Although, in the individual decisions relative signal
confidence is not relevant, absolute signal confidence is still important in determining the pay-
off from investing versus tracking. Rejecting tracking requires a high degree of confidence
in own signals. In the individual experiments, all subjects received a bad signal. Since con-
fidence sufficient to motivate investing in the group context requires that subjects have a high
degree of confidence in their own signal, confident subjects would be less likely to invest in
the individual context. Thus, if measured aggression simply captured subject confidence, then
one would expect that measured aggression would be positively correlated with tracking in the
individual experiment. Thus, the individual decision experiment provides a number of testable
predictions that will aid in identifying the the basis for the effect of measured aggression on
subject behavior in the group experiment:
• If measured aggression reflects subject beliefs regarding the signal quality, then aggres-
sion will be negatively associated with investing.
• If measured aggression reflects personality differences, then the effect of aggression in
the individual experiments should be less than in the group experiments.
• In general, personality factors should explain less of the variation in subject behavior in
the individual experiments.
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We first consider the effect of scores on the aggression instrument on behavior in the in-
dividual experiments. Tables 7 and 8 present univariate tests for the effect of aggression on
portfolio behavior. Table 3 presents non-parametric Mann-Whitney test of the null hypothesis
the median aggression score of tracking subjects is the same as the median aggression score
of the investing subjects. The result of the test is that it is not possible to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the median aggression score level in investing and tracking investors is the same
at conventional levels (p = 0.747). Table 4 presents the results of univariate logit regression
of the probability of investing (as opposed to tracking the market). The null hypothesis, that
the coefficient associated with the aggression score is zero, cannot be rejected at conventional
significance levels p = 0.417. Both of these tests fail to identify a significant effect of the ag-
gression score on portfolio choice in the individual experiments. Moreover, the the coefficient
for aggression in the logit test is positive, albeit insignificant. This is the opposite of one would
expect if measured aggression simply captured signal confidence.
Mann-Whitney Test
µ-Invest µ-Track U P-Value
AGG 26.8 26.5 214.0 0.747
#Obs. 13 31 – –
Table 7: Individual Decisions: Univariate Nonparametric Analysis
Estimate Standard Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept 0.593 1.815 0.327 0.744
AGG -0.0519 0.064 -0.811 0.417
Table 8: Individual Decisions: Univariate Logit Analysis
Next, we consider the overall determinants of the invest vs. track decision using a multivari-
ate logit specification that includes all of the variables. The results are presented in Table 9.
The results show not only that personality variables had a muted effect in the individual experi-
ments, but even that none of the personality variables had any significant effect at conventional
levels. The only significant determinant of the invest vs. track decision identified by the regres-
sion was the risk aversion measure, RISK. The coefficient associated with risk aversion was
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highly significant (p = 0.03) and negative. As discussed in Section 2, increasing risk aversion
makes investing less attractive relative to tracking and thus the sign of the coefficient is in the
predicted direction.
Estimate Std. Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -3.910 8.450 -0.463 0.643
AGG 0.065 0.070 0.923 0.356
AGREE -0.012 0.115 -0.106 0.916
ROTTER 0.412 0.463 0.890 0.374
NEURO -0.025 0.092 -0.276 0.783
OPEN 0.175 0.126 1.390 0.166
CONS 0.079 0.096 0.818 0.413
EXTRA -0.172 0.116 -1.480 0.138
RISK -0.784 0.361 -2.170 0.030
GENDER -1.100 1.130 -0.973 0.331
EXP -0.074 0.083 -0.897 0.370
AGE 0.064 0.069 0.926 0.354
Table 9: Individual Decisions: Multivariate Analysis
Univariate analysis of the individual experiment data confirms the predictive power of risk
aversion in the individual experiments. Table 10 presents non-parametric Mann-Whitney test
while Table 11 presents the results of univariate logit regressions. Risk is identified as a highly
significant factor in the individual decisions by both tests. Moreover, as Table 12 shows the
economic significance of risk a version is quite large, a one standard deviation increase in risk
aversion reduces the predicted probability of of investing by substantially, with the reduction in
the investing probability caused by the upward shift in risk aversion being approximately equal
to half of the estimated probability of investing at the mean level of risk aversion.
Mann-Whitney Test
µ-Invest µ-Track U P-Value
RISK 4.69 5.65 127.000 0.050
#Obs. 10 34 – –
Table 10: Individual Decisions: Univariate Nonparametric Analysis
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Estimate Standard Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept 1.220 1.250 0.977 0.329
RISK -0.405 0.241 -1.680 0.093
Table 11: Individual Decisions: Univariate Analysis
P(µ+σRISK) P(µ) ∆P
Univariate 0.165 0.278 -0.114
Multivariate 0.073 0.225 -0.152
Table 12: Individual Decisions: Economic Significance of Risk Aversion
Overall, these results provide no support for the hypothesis that measured aggression is
acting as proxy for preference or belief characteristics of the subjects. First, the effect of meas-
ured aggression on individual decisions is insignificant and in the opposite direction to the one
that would be expected under the most plausible belief-based hypothesis, signal confidence,
for the aggression/investing relation documented in the group experiment. Second, consistent
with the notion that personality variations matter most in group decision situations, individual
decisions were not significantly effected by the personality variables. Third, measured risk
aversions large and predicted effect on individual decisions, suggests that our measure of risk
aversion effectively captures subject risk preferences. In which case, the very low and positive
correlation between risk aversion and aggressiveness documented in Table 2 casts doubt on the
hypothesis that aggression is a proxy for risk tolerance.
5 Conclusions
This paper considered the effect of aggressiveness on professional manager’s portfolio alloca-
tions. Although references to aggressiveness are ubiquitous in the practitioner literature, to our
knowledge, the effects of aggression on group investment decisions have been largely ignored
in the academic literature on delegated portfolio management. We found that this personality
factor had a very significant effect on behavior—in a group context, a one standard deviation
increase in aggressiveness above the sample average shifted the probability of deviating from
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the market portfolio from approximately 20% to approximately 40%, suggesting that aggress-
iveness has first-order importance for explaining institutional investor behavior.
We think that this paper points to a hitherto ignored “elephant in the room”— the power
of personality in group economic decision making. It tests whether a prima facie important
trait, one that financial firms routinely screen for in hiring, aggressiveness, effects the behavior
of financial professionals. The tests suggest a strong effect. Admittedly, this paper is a first
not a last step in parsing the effect of aggression, and personality in general, on the actions of
institutional investors. Although we point to the elephant, we do not provide an explanation of
how the elephant got into the room. More theoretical research is required to develop a plausible
model of how personality is mediated by preferences, information, and incentives to produce
decisions. More empirical research is required to validate the results of this experiment in
the field and explore how other personality factors, such as extroversion, affect the ability of
aggressive agents to bend group decisions in their preferred direction. Admittedly, this research
will be difficult. The link between personality factors and the economic model of choice is
probably even more “awkward” than the link between the economic model and cognitive biases.
However, as with elephants, the fact that a factor is awkward does not imply that it is not
powerful or that it can be safely ignored.
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Appendix
A Bayes rational decision problem
Let S represent the proposition that three bad signals and two good signals about the investment
have been received. Let H represent the proposition that investing will generate the high payoff
of £24; Let L represent the proposition that investing will generate the low payoff of £14. Let q
represent the investors prior assessment that the high payoff will be realized. Let γ represent the
probability that the signal is good given that the high payoff will be realized; Let β represent
the probability that the signal is bad given that the low payoff will be realized. The only
information given to the subjects regarding q, γ , and β was that the the prior proability that the
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investment would yield a high payoff equals 1/2 and that good signals are more likely when
the investment will yield a high payoff and bad signals are more likely when the investment
yields a low payoff, i.e.,
q = 1/2, 1/2≤ γ ≤ 1, 1/2≤ β ≤ 1. (A-1)
First consider the optimal decision absent information from the signals. The decision to track
produces a nonstochastic cash flow while the decision to invest produces a stochastic cash
flow. Thus, if the expected cash flow from investing is less than the expected cash flow from
tracking, risk averse investors will prefer tracking. Given that q= 1/2 the expected payoff from
investing is less than the expected payoff from tracking. Thus, based on prior information, all
risk neutral or risk averse investors will prefer to track. In the individual decision experiment,
subjects received only one signal, a negative signal, thus their posterior assessment should
be even lower than their prior assessment and hence, a fortiori, all risk averse or risk neutral
subjects should prefer tracking in the individual decision experiment.
Now consider the optimal decision conditioned on the signals in the group decision exper-
iment. Our benchmark is the optimal decision of a Bayesian risk-neutral investor. The utility
of a risk-neutral investor if she invests equals the expected payoff from the investment condi-
tioned on S, while The utility of a risk-neutral investor if she tracks is £20. Thus, investing will
produce a weakly higher expected payoff than tracking if and only if
24P[H|S]+14P[L|S]≥ 20. (A-2)
Because there are only two possible payoffs from investing, high and low, and the payoff from
tracking is riskless, the optimality of investing versus tracking is entirely determined by the
relative odds of a high payoff versus a low payoff. Investing is an optimal strategy if and only
if
odds =
P[H|S]
P[L|S] =
P[H&S]
P[L&S]
≥ 3
2
. (A-3)
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where the equality
P[H|S]
P[L|S] =
P[H&S]
P[L&S]
follows from Bayes rule. Thus, a necessary condition for a risk averse investor to invest rather
than track is that the relative odds of a high payoff versus a low payoff at least equal 3 : 2
A.1 Decision of a risk-neutral Bayesian subject
Now consider the decision problem of a risk-neutral Bayesian subject whose beliefs are based
only on the information provided in the experiment’s instructions. The subjects’s information
is given by equation (A-1). Since this subject has no reason to believe that any value of the
parameters γ , and β ) within the specified ranges is more likely than any other, she will assign
a uniform probability distribution over the specified ranges to these parameters. Thus, subject
beliefs about these parameters will be represented by a uniform distribution over the range of
specified values, i.e.,
γ˜ dist.= Unif[1/2,1], β˜ dist.= Unif[1/2,1].
Because, no information has been provided regarding the relation between these parameters,
the subject beliefs about the value of any one parameter will be independent of her beliefs
about the others.6 Thus, the joint probabilities of H and S, to a Bayesian subject who relies
only on the information provided by the instruction sheet, are represented by H&S and L and
S, represented by L&S, and are given as follows:
P[H&S] = E
[
1/2
(
5
2
)
γ˜2 (1− γ˜)3
]
=
11
384
, (A-4)
P[L&S] = E
[
1/2
(
5
2
)
β˜ 3 (1− β˜ )2
]
=
7
128
. (A-5)
6See Jaynes (2003) for a discussion why these probability assignments optimally mirror the subject’s inform-
ation.
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Therefore, combining equations (A-4) and (A-5) we find that an objective Bayesian subject
would assign odds of
odds =
P[H&S]
P[L&S]
=
11
21
.
Since the subject’s odds are 11 : 21 and the required odds for investing are 3 : 2, the subject
would decisively reject investment in favor of tracking.
A.2 Asymmetric beliefs about quality of good and bad signals
Now suppose that a subject’s beliefs about the parameters of the model deviate from the object-
ive Bayesian assignments. How large of a deviation is required to induce this subject to invest
rather than track? First consider a subjet who assigns the same signal quality to her signals and
the other subjects signals but has arbitrary beliefs the quality of the two signals measured by β
and γ . The odds for this subject are given by
odds =
1/2
(5
2
)
γ2 (1− γ)3
1/2
(5
2
)
β 3 (1−β )2 =
qγ2 (1− γ)3
(1−q)(1−β )2β 3 γ ∈ [0.50,1], β ∈ [0.50,1], q ∈ [0,1].
In order the subject to invest, it must be the case that the subject’s beliefs generate odds at least
equal to 3 : 2. The set of parameters supporting investing and tracking under these assumptions
are illustrated in Figure 1.
From Figure 1 we see that any subject belief under which γ = β , i.e., any belief under which
the estimated precision of the signal is independent of the future realized cash flow, will lead
the subject to track rather than invest. Investing is only supported by the belief that the signal
is much more precise when the realized cash flow is low. In this case, if the realized cash flow
is low, the subject expects almost all the signals to be be bad while if the cash flow is high,
the signals will be more or less random. Since, the the experiment, the number of good signals
is close to the number of bad signals, and thus fairly “random,” such a subject would infer
from the high degree of variation in the signals that the return will be high based on their belief
that signal variance is much higher when the realized payoff is high. As Figure 1 shows, such
posterior assessments are only supported by rather extreme beliefs regarding the asymmetry
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Figure 1: Asymmetric beliefs about signal quality. The horizontal axis represents γ , the probab-
ility that an individual signal is good given that the payoff from investing is high. The vertical
axis represents β , the probability that an individual signal is bad given that the payoff from
investing is low. The Investors prior probability equals 1/2.
of signal quality between good and bad signals. Moreover, note that the the graph in Figure 1
only depicts deviations from tracking under the assumption of subject risk neutrality. Because
deviation also increases risk, risk aversion will further reduce the region over which the subject
will choose to deviate from the tracking. Thus, subjects with a moderate degree of risk aversion
will only deviate to investing under even more extreme beliefs about signal quality asymmetry.
Given that the degree of asymmetry required to support investing is extreme, asymmetry is not
motivated by the experiment’s instructions, and the line of reasoning from these beleifs about
signal asymmetry to posterior assessments is complex, we doubt that subjective assignments of
asymmetric signal quality to good and bad signals is plausible explanation for subject behavior
in the experiments.
Naked Aggression 18th February, 2015 A5
A.3 Overweighting of own signal
Now consider a subject who believes that his own signal is more informative than the signals
received by other agents, i.e., the subject “overweights” his own signal. To abstract from the
issue of asymmetric quality of good and bad signals suppose that under the subject’s subjective
beliefs are that good and bad signals have the same quality, i.e., β = γ . Assume that the subject
assess is own signal quality as equal to o and the quality of the other subjects signal quality is
equal to β = k 1/2+(1−k)o, k∈ [0,1]. Thus, overweighting equal to 1 corresponds to the belief
that the other subjects have completely worthless signals, β = 1/2, while overweighting of 0
corresponds to the belief that the quality of other subject signals is the same as the subject own
signal. When making the decision, an overweighting subject will consider his own signal—
good, and the four signals received by the other agents in the group—three of which are bad
and one of which is good. Thus, the subject’s odds ratio equals
oβ (1−β )3
(1−o)(1−β )β 3 =
o
(
1− k2 − (1− k)o
)2
(1−o) ( k2 +(1− k)o)2
As shown above for a risk neutral investor to invest rather than track the market, the odds
ratio must at least equal 3:2. If the investor exhibits a high, but reasonable given experimental
evidence, level of risk aversion, say the investor has constant proportional risk aversion with a
coefficient of 3, the probability that investing will produce the high return must at least equal
0.773 implying an odds ratio of approximatly 17:5. Figure A.3 depicts levels of overweighting
k and perceived own signal quality o under which the investor will invest and track. From the
Figure we see that overweighting as well as a significant degree of confidence in own signal and
that the degree of overweighting and confidence required increases with subject risk aversion.
A.4 Economic significance of losses from investing rather than tracking
Finally, suppose that the subject has Bayesian objective posterior beliefs. In this case, tracking
is always optimal. However, a natural question to ask is whether the losses from investing rel-
ative to tracking are economically significant. To address this question we plot the percentage
Naked Aggression 18th February, 2015 A6
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Overweighting–k
O
w
n
S
ig
n
a
l
Q
u
a
li
ty
–
o
RN-Inv.
RA-Inv.
Track
Figure 2: The effect of overweighting of own signal. In the figure, the horizontal axes represents
the degree to which a subject attributes excess precision to her own signal relative to the signals
of the other subjects. The vertical axis represents the subject attribution of precision to her
own signal. The vertically hatched region labeled “RN-Inv” represents the set of parameter
value under which the subject will invest if the subject is risk neutral. The horizontally hatched
region labeled “RA-Inv” represents the set of parameters under which the subject will invest if
the subject is risk averse with CPRA utility (coefficient of risk aversion equals 3).
loss from investing relative to tracking of certainty equivalent wealth for a range of possible
risk aversion levels. We assume that the investors utility is specified by a constant proportional
risk aversion (CPRA) utility of wealth function with risk aversion coefficient a. To check the
robustness of our conclusions, we also graph the percentage certainty equivalent loss assuming
that the investor beliefs that the signals are worthless, i.e, β = γ = 1/2. The case were the the
signals are worthless represents a lower bound on the losses to subjects who believe that the
signals are conditionally independent and signal quality is symmetric. As one can see from
Figure A.4, for an objective Bayesian subject, the loss from investing relative to tracking in
percentage terms, ranges from 12% to 20%. Even under the assumption that the signals are
worthless, loss from investing is at least 5%. Thus, the decision to invest rather than track will
have a significant effect on certainty equivalent wealth for Bayesian agents.
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Figure 3: Certainty equivalent loss from tracking. In the figure the horizontal axis represent the
CPRA risk aversion coefficient of the agent. The vertical axis represents the certainty equivalent
loss from investing relative to tracking. The “Objective Bayesian” line represents the loss to an
agent who forms posterior assessment based on the updating procedure outlined in Section A.1;
The “Objective Bayesian” line represents the loss to an agent who forms posterior assessment
based on the belief that both good and bad signals are uninformative.
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B. Instructions and Questionnaire






